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C O M M E N T S

Requiem for Regulation
by Garrett Power
Garrett Power is Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Maryland Carey School of Law.

I.

Introduction

Since 1952, Cornell University Prof. Emeritus John W. Reps
has taught, studied, and written about the planning of cities,
suburbs, and farms.1 The American Planning Association
has recognized him as a planning pioneer.2 He is perhaps
the first scholar to recognize that the best way to understand
planning’s future is to study planning’s past.3 In 1964, Professor Reps delivered the Pomeroy Memorial Lecture at the
American Society of Planning Officials’ annual conference.4
In a talk titled Requiem for Zoning,5 he made three
salient points. First, he rejected the assumption that comprehensive zoning ordinances could provide maps that
would draw bright lines putting everything, once and for
all, in the proper place.6 Second, he urged that planners be
legislatively vested with broad and flexible regulatory powers so as to permit them to guide the community toward
shared social, economic, and environmental goals.7 Third,
his faith in “judicial liberalism” left him assured that the
U.S. Supreme Court would not stand in the way of discretionary and flexible land use planning.8
With the benefit of 50 years’ hindsight, this Comment
considers the prescience of Professor Reps’ observations
and predictions.

II.

Analysis of the Changing Landscape

A.

The Quiet Revolution in Land Planning

By the 1970s, most students of government had come to
agree with Professor Reps that American society needed
Author’s Note: I thank Casandra Mejias, a research fellow in the
Thurgood Marshall Law Library, for outstanding editorial assistance.
1.	
2.	
3.	
4.	
5.	
6.	
7.	
8.	

John W. Reps, John W. Reps Biographical Note, http://urbanplanning.library.
cornell.edu/DOCS/jwrvita.htm (last visited May 28, 2014).
Id.
Id.
John W. Reps, Pomeroy Memorial Lecture: Requiem for Zoning, in Planning 1964: Selected Papers From the ASPO Planning Conference
56 (1964).
Id.
Id.; see also Constance Perin, Everything in Its Place: Social Order
and Land Use in America (1979).
Reps, supra note 4, at 64.
Id. at 66.
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more and better planning.9 According to the consensus
viewpoint, free markets no longer had the answers for the
overcrowded cities, stressed natural environments, and
acute social problems. The national government needed to
take command over water and air quality, and state and
local governments needed top-down federal aid.10 All three
levels of government must follow the example set by the
social democracies of Western Europe and put in place
regulations that would plan for a better society.11
American governments had the constitutionally requisite powers. State and local governments were vested
with a “police power” to promote “public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare.”12 The federal government
was vested with a more specific power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”13 Any new regulations however, might deprive some private owners of their
property rights and might deprive some capitalists of their
“investment-backed expectations.”14 And the U.S. Constitution prohibited all governments from “taking” private
property15 or “impairing” contract rights.16 The Constitution even more sharply curtailed the regulatory power of
the national government to matters of interstate trade.17
When would bold new plans for a Great Society not run
afoul of the Constitution?
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. had
answered that question in the landmark 1922 case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.18 Therein he opined that when “the
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”19
His statement, of course, begged the constitutional question: How far is too far?

9.	

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See Fred Bosselman & David Callies, Council on Envtl. Quality, The
Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control (1971); Otis L. Graham, Towards a Planned Society (1976); Charles Reich, The Law of the Planned
Society, 75 Yale L.J. 1227 (1966).
Id.
Id.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
U.S. Const. art. I, §8.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 8 ELR 20528
(1978).
U.S. Const. amend. V.
U.S. Const. art. I, §10.
U.S. Const. art. I, §8.
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
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Constitutional Limitations on Regulations

By the three-quarter mark of the 20th century, a remarkable set of Supreme Court precedents had swollen the
regulatory powers of governments while shrinking private
rights to property and contract. The Court had given the
regulators wide discretion. Consider the following:
In Lewis v. Blue Point Oysters Cultivation Co., the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) dredged a shipping
channel that destroyed a company’s privately owned oyster
grounds on the bed of Long Island Sound.20 The Supreme
Court’s 1913 decision held that the U.S. Congress’ dominant power over the nation’s navigable waterways trumped
private property rights.21
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., an Ohio town
enacted a building zone law that prohibited a landowner
from making commercial business use of its main street
property,22 which devalued the lot by two-thirds.23 Ruling
in 1926, the Court upheld the village’s decision to create
exclusively residential districts.24 It concluded that “the
validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes
[being] fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be
allowed to control.”25 Regulations are presumed to bear
a “rational relation[ship] to the health and safety of the
community”26; the burden of proof is on the challenger to
show that the regulations “go too far.”27
In the 1928 case Miller v. Schoene, the state of Virginia
destroyed a landowner’s ornamental cedar trees that harbored a plant disease and were infecting apple orchards in
the vicinity.28 The Court condoned the practice: “When
forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class
of property in order to save another which, in the judgment
of the legislature, is of greater value to the public.”29 When
the public benefit from regulations exceeds the private loss,
the Constitution guarantees no compensation.30
In 1940, in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power
Co., the Court considered whether a federal agency had
licensing authority over the location of a hydroelectric
facility on a river running between two states.31 The first
exercises of the Commerce Power had been designed to
promote waterborne transport of goods.32 But by the 20th
century, the Court recognized that the federal government
was also empowered to regulate broader aspects of the
nation’s economy.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Lewis v. Blue Point Oysters Cultivation Co., 229 U.S. 82, 85 (1913).
Id. at 89.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 383-84 (1926).
Id. at 384.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 389 (implying that a regulation would have to be arbitrary and beyond the bounds of reason to overcome presumption of validity).
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277 (1928).
Id. at 279.
Id. at 280.
United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713 (1865).
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In Berman v. Parker, a District of Columbia urban
renewal agency used its power of eminent domain to take
the landowner’s building as part of a slum clearance project.33 The landowner objected that his building was not a
slum,34 and that it was to be retransferred after the clearance to the private ownership of another.35 In 1954, the
Court ruled for the government.36 If just compensation is
paid, then the government may take private property for
any purpose it considers a public purpose.37
These precedents set the stage for the 1978 landmark
case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.38
The New York City Landmark Preservation Board had
denied permission for Penn Central Railroad to build a
skyscraper atop its historic Grand Central Station.39 The
loss to the railroad was approximately $50 million.40 The
Court’s opinion demonstrated the analysis to be employed
when determining whether regulations go “too far.”41 It
engaged in “an essentially ad hoc factual inquiry” without
any “set formula” and created a multifactor balancing test
that considered the magnitude of the loss, the interference
with investment-backed expectation, and the character of
the government action.42 In the balance, the Court’s majority determined that no unconstitutional taking of private
property had occurred.43
Associate Justice William Rehnquist dissented.44 He
simply observed that under the real property law of New
York, air rights were a separable property interest, which
the Board’s ruling denied the railroad’s right to sell.45
From Justice Rehnquist’s point of view, no amount of “ad
hoc balancing” could rationalize away the taking of the
air rights.46
Post-Penn Central, there appeared to be no real obstacles—political or constitutional—to the creation of a
well-planned, pollution-free society. Congress established
national standards for “clean air”47 and “clean water.”48
When the Nixon Administration’s federal land use initiative49 was left in the lurch by President Richard Nixon’s
resignation as he faced impeachment, state governments

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

48.
49.

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954).
Id. at 31.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 36.
Id.
438 U.S. 104, 8 ELR 20528 (1978).
Id. at 117.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 124.
Id.
Id. at 137.
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent was joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and
Associate Justice John Paul Stevens. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 138, 8 ELR 20528 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 142.
Id. at 148-49.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816. The Clean Water Act (CWA)
is codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387, ELR Stat. FWPCA
§§101-607.
Clean Air Act (CAA), Pub. L. No. 88-206, 69 Stat. 322 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat. CAA §§101-618.).
Land Use Policy & Planning Assistance Act, S. 268, 93rd Cong. (1973).
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undertook their own “quiet revolution in land use control.”50
State laws addressed the complex problems of reallocating
responsibilities between state and local governments.51 At
the local level, detailed zoning maps had been supplanted
by development agreements.52 Negotiations between the
local jurisdiction and the landowner contractually fixed
the terms and conditions upon which projects may go forward.53 The developer was contractually guaranteed project approval, while the locality benefitted from customized
performance standards and assurances that infrastructure
demands would be meet.54

C.

The Planned Society Reconsidered

Ronald Reagan was elected president in 1980, taking
office in 1981. In his Inaugural Address, President Reagan proclaimed that “government is not the solution to our
problem, government is the problem.”55 He blamed government regulations for the nation’s shortcomings.56 Justice Rehnquist, the Court’s leading property rights activist,
now found himself with an ally in the White House.57 For
the next 17 years, Justice Rehnquist would endeavor to
muster a majority of Justices willing to reverse or ignore
the pro-planning precedents.58 He set out to curtail the
federal Commerce Power and to require compensation to
all property holders for all “regulatory takings” by all levels
of government.59
Justice Rehnquist had already had his first success in
Kaiser Aetna v. United States in 1979.60 In that case, the
Corps’ effort to turn a privately owned tidal pond into a
public aquatic park was declared unconstitutional.61 Private parties could once again assert property rights in
the nation’s waterways. Lewis was not overruled, but it
was forgotten.62
In 1982, Justice Rehnquist forged a surprising collaboration when he joined a majority opinion authored by
the liberal Justice Thurgood Marshall in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.63 New York law authorized a cable television utility to place a transformer atop
a landowner’s building, without permission.64 Rather
than subjectively balancing the public good against the
50. Bosselman & Callies, supra note 9, at 1 (1971).
51. Id. at 319-20.
52. John J. Delaney, Development Agreements Legislation: The Maryland Experience, SB06 ALI-ABA 805, 811-12 (1996).
53. Id. at 811.
54. Id. at 812.
55. Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981), in Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States From George Washington 1789 to George Bush 1989, 331, 332 (2008).
56. Id.
57. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 Ind. L.J.
363, 366-67 (2003).
58. See id. at 391.
59. See id. at 392.
60. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 10 ELR 20042 (1979).
61. Id. at 181.
62. Lewis v. Blue Point Oysters Cultivation Co., 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
63. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
64. Id. at 421.
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private loss, the Court ruled (and Justice Rehnquist
agreed) that any governmentally ordered “permanent
physical occupation” must be categorically compensable.65 The Penn Central precedent was not overruled, but
it was displaced by a bright-line rule of compensation in
this situation.
In 1986, President Reagan elevated Justice Rehnquist
to Chief Justice and appointed Justice Antonin Scalia
as an Associate Justice.66 At their investiture, President Reagan charged them both to use their seats on
the Court to downsize and disempower governments
at all levels.67 Thereafter, Justices Scalia and Rehnquist
worked together in an effort to convince at least three
other Justices to join them in constitutionally curbing
the planning powers of governments.
In 1987, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
a state commission had “leveraged its police power” by
demanding the dedication of a public beachfront easement
as the price for approval of a private landowner’s building
permit application.68 Writing for a five-Justice majority on
a split Court, Justice Scalia strictly scrutinized the transaction and struck it down as an “out and out plan of extortion” in the absence of proof by the regulator that there
was an “essential nexus” between the burden on the public
from the proposed construction and the “kickback” mitigation exacted from the applicant.69
In 1994, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the regulator
demanded dedication of a bicycle trail as the price of
approval of an expansion of a hardware store.70 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of five, conceded the
nexus between the bike trail and increased business traffic,
but added the requirement that the cost to the applicant be
“roughly proportionate” to the burden that the requested
activity would place on the public.71
In these two cases, Justices Rehnquist and Scalia had
worked in tandem to turn the standard of constitutional
review upside down. Under the Village of Euclid tradition,
regulatory actions were presumed constitutional and could
only be overturned if the challenger met the heavy burden of proving that the law had “no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”72 As
reconceived by Nollan and Dolan, police power exactions
were constitutionally invalid unless the regulator could
meet the burden of proving them to be justified.73
The totality-of-the-circumstances test and balancing modes of analysis found in Penn Central were the
65. Id. at 441.
66. Johnsen, supra note 57, at 399.
67. Ronald Reagan, Former President of the United States, Speech at the Investiture of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Associate Justice Antonin
Scalia at the White House (Sept. 26, 1986), in Originalism: A QuarterCentury of Debate (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007).
68. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828, 17 ELR 20918
(1987).
69. Id.
70. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 380, 24 ELR 21083 (1994).
71. Id. at 391.
72. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
73. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591, 43
ELR 20140 (2013).

Copyright © 2014 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

44 ELR 10926

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

bane of Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence. It was far better,
he would say, for constitutional tests to take the form of
clear and principled rules of decision; bright lines, and
clear categories creating a “Rule of Law” rather than a
rule of judges.74
An opportunity for Justice Scalia to overrule Penn Central was presented in 1992, when certiorari was granted in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission.75 South Carolina legislation had established a new setback line that was
necessary to “prevent serious public harm,” but which rendered Lucas’ oceanfront building lots “value-less.”76 Justice
Scalia was not successful in his effort to muster a majority
willing to reject Penn Central’s balanced public-interest
analysis altogether, but he was able to convince four other
Justices to join him in creating an exception.77 His opinion
adopted the “bright-line” principle of law that regulations
that deny “all economically beneficial or productive use of
land” are categorically compensable.78 Total takings are per
se compensable.79
The 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London found
Justices Rehnquist and Scalia on the losing side of a split
5-4 decision reminiscent of Berman.80 The majority opinion held that New London’s power of eminent domain
could be used to transfer property from one private person to another private person who, from the city’s point
of view, would use it for a more economically productive
use.81 The dissent, in which Justice Rehnquist and Scalia
joined, would have adopted the bright-line rule that eminent domain could not be used to implement the city’s
plans seeking purely economic benefits.82
The majority opinion in Kelo, which legitimized the taking of private property for private economic development,
was met with widespread outrage.83 The public mood
had turned against grand plans.84 Forty-odd state legislatures imposed limits on exercises of the power of eminent
domain85 and President George W. Bush issued an executive order restricting use of the federal power.86 State and
federal elected officials (and the body politic) had lost faith
in the ability of regulators to act in the public interest. Outside of the courtroom, the desirability of a “planned society” was in doubt.

74. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175,
1187-88 (1989).
75. 505 U.S. 1003, 22 ELR 21104 (1992).
76. Id. at 1008-09.
77. Id. at 1007.
78. Id. at 1117-18.
79. Id. at 1035.
80. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 35 ELR 20134 (2005).
81. Id. at 488-89.
82. Id. at 498.
83. Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93
Minn. L. Rev. 2100, 2108 (2009).
84. See id. at 2120.
85. See 50 State Report Card, Castle Coal, http://castlecoalition.org/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2412&Itemid=129 (last visited
May 24, 2014).
86. Exec. Order No. 13406, 71 Fed. Reg. 36973 (June 23, 2006).
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The Roberts Court

The Kelo term also marked a changing of the guard on
the Supreme Court. Upon the 2005 death of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice John Roberts was appointed the
new Chief Justice. And by 2006, the reconfigured Roberts Court was perhaps the most conservative in decades.87
A right-wing bloc of Justices (Roberts, Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, and Samuel Alito) could be counted upon to
vote in favor of private property rights and against government regulations in almost each and every case. But they
still needed a fifth vote to finish the job of eliminating the
liberal precedents left over from the 20th century. Justice
Anthony Kennedy would often swing to the conservative
side, but he could not always be counted upon.88
For example, the Court had recognized in 1940 in
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co. that “navigable waters [were] subject to national planning and control
in the broad regulation of commerce granted the Federal
Government.”89 The Corps had accepted that mandate
(with the approval of the Supreme Court90) and required
its permission as a prerequisite to private excavation and
filling projects that had any impact on the U.S. hydrological cycle.91 The Corps had effectively reconstituted itself as
the federal land use control agency.
In the 2006 case Rapanos v. United States, a farmer
had been found civilly liable for draining a marshy field
without the Corps’ permission.92 The drainage project
was more than 11 miles away from the nearest navigable
water course.93 Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Roberts,
Thomas, and Alito, authored the plurality opinion vacating
the judgment on the ground that the Corps’ jurisdiction
only extended to wetlands with a continuous surface connection to a flowing waterway.94 But the plurality opinion
lacked the fifth vote necessary for a majority.95 Justice Kennedy concurred in the result, but he proposed a “significant
nexus” test that left the test of the territorial expanse of the
Corps’ jurisdiction in constitutional limbo.96
The 2009 case Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida
Department of Environmental Protection considered the
constitutionality of a Florida law that rewarded owners of eroding oceanfront lots with government-funded
beach replenishment, but took as a price the owners’ lit-

87. Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y.
Times, July 25, 2010, at A1.
88. See Lisa K. Parshall, Embracing the Living Constitution: Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy’s Move Away From a Conservative Methodology of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 N.C. Cent. L. Rev. 25, 28 (2007).
89. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940).
90. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 16 ELR
20086 (1985); but see Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cnty. v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 31 ELR 20382 (2001).
91. Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg.
31320 (July 25, 1975).
92. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 36 ELR 20116 (2006).
93. Id. at 720.
94. Id. at 739.
95. Id. at 719.
96. Id. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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toral rights to future accretions.97 When the right wing of
the Roberts Court (composed of Justices Roberts, Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito) found that they were unable to garner
the fifth vote needed to strike down the statute as a whole,
they switched sides so as to qualify Justice Scalia to write
the opinion. The Court held for the state on the basis of
a misbegotten misunderstanding of Florida property law,
and thereby avoided application of the dreaded Penn Central balancing test.98
Justice Scalia’s strategy seems clear enough. If the public-interest balancing test in Penn Central cannot be overturned, it nonetheless can be avoided. And by his dicta,
Justice Scalia planted the seed of precedent that every
oceanfront owner has a littoral right to accretions that is
a separable property interest.99 Justice Scalia opined that
once the “bundle of rights” that constitutes property is
broken, each separate right is entitled to separate constitutional protection; every taking becomes a total taking that
is per se compensable under the Lucas rule.100 Since Justice
Scalia’s dicta were not dispositive of the case, the left wing
of the Court (composed of Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan) seems
not to have taken notice.101
In 2013, in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management
District, Justice Kennedy joined the right-wing bloc of Justices to create the majority of five in an opinion authored
by Justice Alito.102 A permit applicant had engaged in
negotiation with the regulator concerning the terms and
conditions upon which a project might go forward.103 The
applicant offered to mitigate environmental effects of his
development proposal by deeding a conservation easement,
but the regulator wanted more, demanding a reduction in
the project size and some off-site improvements.104 Negotiations broke down, and the permit was denied.105 The
applicant filed suit alleging a “regulatory taking.”106
Under the leading 20th century precedent of Village of
Euclid, permit denials are presumed valid.107 To prove a
rejection unconstitutional, the applicant would have the
burden of proving that “on balance” under the “totality
of the circumstances” the regulator’s demands went “too
far.”108 Few if any property owners could meet the burden
of proof imposed by the Penn Central test.
97. Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S.
702, 40 ELR 20160 (2010).
98. Id. at 732-33; see also Garrett Power, Property Rights, the “Gang of Four” &
the Fifth Vote: Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection (U.S. Supreme Court 2010), 21 Widener L. Rev.
627 (2012).
99. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 708.
100. Id. at 713.
101. Id. at 742-45.
102. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591, 43
ELR 20140 (2013).
103. Id. at 2592-93.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2591.
106. Id. at 2593.
107. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
108. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 8 ELR 20528
(1978).
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Justice Alito took a different view of the Constitution.
He glommed onto the Nollan/Dolan precedents and considered the breakdown of negotiations as, in effect, the
issuance of a permit with conditions attached.109 Under
those precedents, the burden of proof was switched to
the regulator who was required to prove an “essential
nexus” and “rough proportionality” between its negotiating demands and the environmental impact of the proposed development.110 The Court remanded the case for
a determination of whether the regulator had imposed an
“unconstitutional condition.”111
The Koontz case may have a profound effect on land
use regulation. Nowadays, site-specific development agreements have replaced zoning maps as the favored means of
public land use control.112 Negotiations between the local
jurisdiction and the landowner contractually fix the terms
and conditions upon which a project may go forward.113
Such agreements benefit the developer with a contractual
guarantee of approval, and benefit the locality with customized performance standards and assurances that infrastructure demands will be meet.114 But when negotiations
fail, the Court may, under the Koontz holding, secondguess the legitimacy of the conditions proffered by the government and then require the government to pay damages
if the conditions go “too far.”

III. Fifty-Year Retrospective
In 1964, Professor Reps conducted a “requiem for
zoning.”115 He urged that land use controls imposed by the
bright lines on the zoning maps be erased and replaced by
flexible discretionary public regulations that would guide
the community toward a planned society of livable communities with affordable housing, adequate infrastructure, clean water and air, preserved landmarks, sustained
resources, and environmental justice.116 He expressed
“naïve faith” that a liberal judiciary would have no constitutional objections.117
Now, 50 years later, Professor Reps’ observations and
predictions seem to be both right and wrong. Old-fashioned zoning has been buried in a shallow grave. Today’s
land use is controlled by multiple, often overlapping permits at the federal, state, and local levels. The Corps asserts
a broadly defined jurisdiction over the waters of the United
States, state governments mandate clean water and clean
air and protect wetlands, and local governments demand
building permits and exact fees and in-kind contributions
from developers.
109. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2596, 43
ELR 20140 (2013).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2603.
112. See Delaney, supra note 52.
113. Id. at 821.
114. Id. at 811-12.
115. See Reps, supra note 4.
116. Id. at 64.
117. Id. at 66.

Copyright © 2014 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

During the first two-thirds of the 20th century, Professor Reps’ faith in the Supreme Court was well-placed. Just
as he had predicted, the “judicial liberalism” in these Court
precedents had created a living Constitution that changed
with the times.118 The Justices took it upon themselves to
balance public benefits against private losses and approved
bold government plans for a better society.
But in the years since then, the Court’s judicial conservatives have sometimes shown renewed determination to
curtail governmental activity in general, and to limit federal, state, and local planning in particular. As a result of
their constitutional decisions:
• Physical occupations are per se compensable119;
• Total takings are per se compensable120;
• When a regulator and a developer fail to agree, the
regulator bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of its demands121;
• Regulations necessary to prevent a significant public
harm are not excused from constitutional requirements of compensation122;
• Private owners have protected property rights in the
navigable waters of the United States123;
• Federal land use controls only extend to lands connected to waterways.124
And if the Roberts Court can find a fifth vote, it may
soon be constitutional law that:
• The mode of analysis found in the landmark
Penn Central decision (an ad hoc public-interest
balancing test) is replaced with bright-line rules
of compensability;
• The sticks in the “bundle of rights” in land are considered separately so that the regulatory denial of
any stick is considered a “total taking” and is to be
per se compensable;
• Exercises of the power of eminent domain are limited to situations where government itself intends to
physically occupy the premises.

118. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 8 ELR 20528 (1978).
119. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
120. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 22 ELR 21104
(1992).
121. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591, 43
ELR 20140 (2013).
122. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1118-22.
123. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 36 ELR 20116 (2006).
124. Id. at 739.
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Professor Reps’ 1964 “requiem for zoning”125 was correct in its observation that the bright line on zoning maps,
which promised to put everything and everybody in the
proper place, was being supplanted by flexible public plans.
The “zoners” were being replaced by planners vested with
discretionary regulatory powers said to be necessary to
create pollution-free communities with affordable houses,
good schools, thriving commerce, and more than adequate
public services.126
But Professor Reps was wrong in his faith that the
Court would not stand in the way of discretionary and
flexible land use planning. Court decisions, coupled with
the public outrage triggered by the Kelo holding, disempowered the planners. What better way to discourage
planning than to require that governments compensate
property owners for all of the private losses associated
with its regulations? Now seems the time to compose a
“requiem for regulation.”

IV.

Coda

The future of American planning remains in doubt. On
the basic question as to whether to look to governments
for the solutions to economic and social problems, the
Roberts Court is divided into two equal blocs.127 The laissez-faire bloc is headed by Justice Scalia, joined by longtime ally Justice Thomas and relative newcomers Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. The pro-planning bloc
is headed by Justice Breyer, who is joined by his longtime ally Justice Ginsberg and relative newcomers Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan. Justice Kennedy moves back and
forth between the two factions, often providing the decisive vote in 5-4 decisions.
While both sides may claim a “humble obedience to the
Constitution,”128 the real division seems ideological. The
laissez-faire bloc wants to downsize government at whatever the cost; the pro-planning bloc looks to government
for a solution to public problems. Only retirements, deaths,
and appointments will tip the Court balance one way or
the other.

125. Reps, supra note 4.
126. See Delaney, supra note 52.
127. See Greg Stohr, Roberts Supreme Court’s Partisan Split Shows New Justices Are
Predictable, Bloomberg, July 1, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2011-07-01/roberts-supreme-court-s-partisan-split-shows-newjustices-are-predictable.html; David Paul Kuhn, The Incredible Polarization
and Politicization of the Supreme Court, Atlantic, June 29, 2012, available
at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-incrediblepolarization-and-politicization-of-the-supreme-court/259155/.
128. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Cosmic Constitutional Theory: Why Americans Are Losing Their Inalienable Right to Self-Governance 46
(Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 2012).
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